The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance : Theory and Evidence by 岡田 敏裕 & 大洞 公平
 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
Discussion paper No.45 
 
 
The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm 
Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence 
 
 
 
 
Toshihiro Okada 
Kwansei Gakuin University 
 
Kohei Daido 
Kwansei Gakuin University 
 
 
May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY 
 
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho 
Nishinomiya 662-8501, Japan 
The Eﬀects of Corporate Finance on Firm
Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence*
Toshihiro Okada†
Kwansei Gakuin University
Kohei Daido‡
Kwansei Gakuin University
Abstract
Some firms may exhibit better operating performance than others because they
undertake riskier projects: risk-return tradeoﬀ. We develop a model to examine
the eﬀects of financial contracts on a firm’s choice between safer (lower risk, lower
return) and riskier (higher risk, higher return) projects. The model shows that,
assuming a competitive capital market (i.e., financiers with no monopoly power),
three types of financial contracts can each be an equilibrium contract, depending
on conditions. We show that firms undertake “safer” projects when using rollover
loans (i.e., short-term loans with a possible rollover option), while firms undertake
“riskier” projects when using non-rollover loans (i.e., long-term loans) or new share
issues. The model emphasizes the role of rollover loans (with passive monitoring)
as a potential disciplinary device to suppress a firm’s risk-taking. The model gen-
erates several predictions about the determinants of a firm’s risk-taking and its
performance. One key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with
closer bank relationships are more likely to use rollover loans and undertake “safer”
projects, even with a contestable capital market. We find novel empirical support
for the model’s predictions.
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1 Introduction
To explain the operating performance of a firm, we usually consider its eﬃciency. A more
eﬃcient firm obtains more from a given amount of resources. Many studies have looked
at firm performance through this lens. Researchers have considered various factors (e.g.,
inadequate production technologies, insuﬃcient managerial eﬀorts, perks, and under- and
over-investment) to be a potential source of firm ineﬃciency and have investigated what
mechanisms might help reduce these ineﬃciencies.1
Apart from eﬃciency, a firm’s risk-taking behavior can also be an important deter-
minant of its operating performance.2 Some firms may exhibit better performance than
others simply because they undertake riskier business operations: risk-return tradeoﬀ.3
In general, a firm has many diﬀerent product lines and departments. A firm’s business
operation can thus be viewed as a collection of many diﬀerent individual activities with
their own risk-return characteristics. Then, by applying the well-known theory of port-
folio selection in finance, we can say that by diversification a firm faces a set of business
operations on the eﬃcient frontier–the frontier is, in the present context, the set of
risk-return choices from the business operation opportunity set where for a given vari-
ance (risk) no other business operation opportunity oﬀers a higher expected return, and
the frontier is monotonically increasing in the (variance, expected return) space. This
means that a firm gets higher expected returns by choosing a riskier business operation.
Conditions and events that change a firm’s risk-taking behavior can therefore alter its
performance. In this paper, we focus on this risk-taking channel to study firm operating
performance. In other words, we consider movement along the eﬃciency frontier rather
than a shift in the frontier.4
Although various factors aﬀect the risk-taking channel, corporate governance is prob-
ably one of the most important. Suppose that a firm has two projects (two business
operations): the "safe" project and the "risky" project. The safe project has the lower
expected returns and the fewer risks, and the risky project has the higher expected re-
turns and the more risks. If the firm’s financier prefers the safe project and the corporate
1See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) on perks and over-investment, Myers (1977) on under-
investment, Myers and Majluf (1984) on under-investment, Jensen (1986) on free cash flows, Stultz (1990)
on over- and under-investment, and Aghion and Bolton (1992) on perks.
2By "risk-taking", we mean the extent to which a firm is willing to engage in conduct with an
uncertain outcome for the firm.
3Gilley, Walters, and Olson (2002) investigate the influence of the risk-taking propensity of top
management teams on firm performance. They show that managerial risk-taking has a strong positive
influence on firm performance. The recent study reported by John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) examines
managerial incentives to take value-enhancing risks in relation to the investor protection environment.
They find that better investor protection leads to higher firm risk-taking and, consequently, greater
growth.
4Our paper diﬀers from "under-investment" and "over-investment" stories, which focus on eﬃciency.
In addition, while the over-investment (asset substitution eﬀects) story of Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and the under-investment (debt overhang) story of Myers (1997) are about the agency cost of debt
financing, we stress the benefit of debt financing to investors.
1
governance works well, the firm is disciplined to take the safe project even if it is risk
neutral and thus prefers the risky project.
Considering the impact of corporate governance on the risk-taking channel, it is not
hard to imagine that a financial contract plays a crucial role in determining a firm’s
risk-taking behavior. A key aspect of corporate governance is how a firm’s financiers
obtain a return on their investment. The first step to assure this return is to deliberately
design a financial contract. A well-designed financial contract can establish eﬀective
corporate governance, and thus have an impact on a firm’s choice between safer (lower
risk, lower return) and riskier (higher risk, higher return) business operations. This
paper examines the eﬀects of a financial contract on a firm’s risk-taking, which in turn
aﬀects its performance.
We develop a model to study the eﬀects of a financial contract on a firm’s choice be-
tween safer (lower variance, lower expected return) and riskier (higher variance, higher
expected return) projects. The model assumes, for simplicity, that a risk-neutral firm has
two projects: the "safe" project and the "risky" project, where the former has the lower
expected return and the lower variance while the latter has the higher expected return
and the higher variance. We consider a situation in which the firm requires financing
from a risk-neutral competitive investor (competition exists between multiple principals:
multiple bank investors and equity investors). In the model, (in which the firm’s action
is unverifiable,) the firm prefers the risky project, but the bank investor wants the firm
to choose the safe project; i.e., an agency problem exists between the firm and the bank
investor (in contrast, no agency problem exist between the firm and the equity investor).
The model shows that three types of (exclusive) financial contracts can each be an equilib-
rium contract, depending on various conditions. The three contracts are: (i) a bank loan
contract with an unconditional early loan demand option (i.e., an unconditional early
liquidation option), (ii) a bank loan contract without the early demand option, and (iii)
an equity contract. The second and third contracts are considered a long-term (normal)
loan and a new share issue, respectively. The first contract is considered a short-term
loan with a possible loan rollover. Rollover loans are commonly found in banking.
We argue that, while a firm undertakes a project with higher expected returns and
more risks when choosing a normal (non-rollover) loan or a new share issue, it undertakes
a project with lower expected returns and fewer risks when choosing a rollover loan. The
loan contract with the early loan demand option (the early liquidation option) in the
model preserves the most important feature of a rollover loan; i.e., a bank’s total control
over continuation of the project implemented by the borrowing firm. In reality, a bank
often refuses to roll-over maturing short-term loans.5 In the model, the early loan demand
option is not contingent on the firm’s action (playing it safe or risky) because the action
5The rollover condition is very often not written in a contract, but a bank and its borrower both
know that the loan will be rolled over if nothing happens.
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is unverifiable. The bank holding the contract can thus liquidate the project early at will.
At first glance, it seems hard for the loan contract with the early demand option to be
the equilibrium contract of the model because: (i) the agency problem exists between the
firm and the bank investor (but not between the firm and the equity investor), (ii) the firm
chooses any of the three competitive contracts, and (iii) the bank with the demandable
loan contract can liquidate the project early at will. We will show, however, that under
certain conditions the firm selects the early demandable loan contract in equilibrium.
There are three crucial and necessary reasons why, under certain conditions, the loan
contract with the early demand (at will) option becomes an equilibrium contract and
the risk-neutral firm chooses the "safe" project with this contract. The first reason is
concerned with the credibility of the contract. The model shows that the loan contract
with the early demand option (which is oﬀered by a bank investor) can be credible to
the firm in two ways. It can be credible in the sense that the firm knows that the bank
investor will liquidate the project if the firm chooses the risky project. It can also be
credible in the sense that the firm knows that the bank will not liquidate the project (i.e.,
the bank will let the business go) as long as the firm chooses the safe project. The first
form of credibility works as a disciplinary device to constrain the firm’s risk-taking, and
the latter form of credibility makes the contract acceptable to the firm even though it
gives the bank total control over the firm’s operation. The second reason why the early
demandable loan contract can be an equilibrium contract relates to the cost of liquidating
firm assets. Firm assets include intangible assets like firm-specific knowledge and know-
how, so that the firm assets become much less valuable if they are taken over by the bank
investor (i.e., the debt holder) upon default due to project failure. In the model of our
paper, this leads the bank to strongly prefer the "safe" project to the "risky" project.
The bank may thus have an incentive to oﬀer an interest rate low enough for the firm
to choose the early demandable loan contract, knowing that with this interest rate the
contract is credible in the ways described above. The third reason is concerned with the
dilution of manager shareholdings. In the model, the manager of the firm owns part of
the firm’s shares. The new share issue dilutes the manager’s shareholdings and thus may
lead the manager to prefer the bank loan to the new share issue.
Close analysis of the model reveals the relationship between a firm’s risk-taking (and
thus its performance) and three key variables of the model. The three variables are: the
firm’s relationship with banks, the number of the firm’s outstanding shares and the firm’s
scale of production. The model predicts that, holding all other factors fixed, the extent
of a firm’s risk-taking, and thus its operating performance, is negatively related to the
closeness of its relationship with banks and the scale of its production and positively
related to the number of its outstanding shares.
One key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with closer bank rela-
tionships are more likely to use rollover loans and undertake "safer" business operations,
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even with a contestable capital market. This prediction is partially attributed to het-
erogeneous monitoring costs: in our model, bank investors having closer relationships
with its client firms have informational advantages in passive monitoring (i.e., collect-
ing information about firms) and the early liquidation by bank investors requires passive
monitoring. If the prediction is correct, our model could explain an interesting fact about
the distribution of firm ROA across countries. Kameda and Takagawa (2003) compare
the distribution of ROA for Japanese firms with those observed for other countries, and
find that the ROA distribution for Japanese firms has a much lower variance and mean
than those observed for firms in other countries. This is consistent with the prediction
that the closer relationship a firm has with banks, the safer and less profitable project
the firm is likely to undertake. In fact, many Japanese firms are aﬃliated with a "main
bank" and thus probably have a much closer relationship with banks than firms in other
countries.
Using a panel of data obtained for Japanese firms, we find empirical support for the
model’s predictions. Our empirical method has some new features. We show that al-
though it is not possible to observe how much risk a firm has actually taken, a reasonable
assumption about firm risk-taking and our newly proposed measure of performance un-
certainty can together provide a reliable test of the model. We do not employ commonly
used variables, such as the ex post variance of firm performance, in order to measure ex
ante uncertainty of firm performance (i.e., ex ante risk). Using the ex post variance as a
good proxy for ex ante uncertainty of firm performance requires a reasonable number of
time-series observations of firm performance. This severely limits the number of usable
observations for a regression, since usually only a short time-series of panel data on firm
performance is available. The proposed method does not require many time-series obser-
vations of firm performance to measure the uncertainty, so that the regressions can use
a much lager number of time-series observations. In addition, we show that our method
can provide a more accurate measure of the uncertainty. These features allow us to, in
testing our model, reliably carry out a panel regression to control for a firm-specific eﬀect,
a time eﬀect and a heterogeneous linear time trend (i.e., to control for unobserved firm
eﬃciency), and thus mitigate the problem of omitted variable bias.
The most closely related work is a paper by Weinstein and Yafeh (1998). Using data
on Japanese firms, they provide indirect evidence that banks exert pressure on their client
firms and influence the firms to forgo high-risk, high-expected-return projects according
to the bank’s preference.6 They argue that underdeveloped capital markets provide banks
with monopoly power, and Japanese main banks have taken advantage of this situation
and have suppressed a firm’s risk-taking behavior. Our study is complementary to their
6They find the lack of a significant advantage in growth rates for firms under main bank influence
and interpret this as evidence that main banks induce their client firms to take less risky projects which
lead to lower growth rates.
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work. The model of our paper shows that a bank may aﬀect a client firm’s risk-taking be-
havior even though a capital market is competitive, and the empirical test provides direct
evidence of the eﬀect of bank-firm relationships on firm risk-taking and performance.
Our study is related to the literature emphasizing the disciplinary role of debt in
an incomplete contract setting. The literature includes Dewatripont and Tirole (1994),
Berglof and von Thadden (1994), Zwiebel (1996), and Grinstein (2006), among many
others.7 The paper diﬀers from previous studies in a few important ways. First, our
paper shows that the firm exhibits worse operating performance if it chooses a bank loan
(debt) contract with disciplinary power over the firm. This result is diﬀerent from that
of other studies in which the debt contract disciplines the manager to work eﬃciently,
and has a positive eﬀect on firm performance. Second, the present paper diﬀers in terms
of allocation of control rights. In other studies, the debt holder is given control rights
contingent on the verifiable outcome of default. In contrast, in our model the bank (the
debt holder) can liquidate the project of its borrowing firm to demand an early loan
payment at will. That is, the bank has non-contingent control rights.
The paper is also related to the work of Repullo and Suarez (1998) and Gordon and
Kahn (2000). They also consider the disciplinary role of a loan contract with the option
for a bank to liquidate its loan at will.8 Their treatment of the liquidation option diﬀers
from ours. In Repullo and Suarez (1998), the option is exogenously included in a loan
contract. In our paper, the option is endogenously included; i.e., the bank has a choice
between including the option or not, and it decides by considering what other bank
investors (and equity investors) would do. In Gordon and Kahn (2000), the liquidation
is contingent on verifiable events. They assume that a bank loan contract includes a
large number of covenants, such that a small change in the state of a borrowing firm will
violate at least one covenant. This assumption makes it possible for a bank to execute
its liquidation option at will at any time. In contrast, in our model, the execution of the
option is not contingent on anything.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a model of firm risk-taking
and financial contracting, Section 3 discusses the empirical method and presents the
results, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
7Earlier literature stressing the benefit of debt financing in mitigating an agency problem includes
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986).
8Tirole (2006, Chapter 8.4) also studies the role of demandable loan contracts and bank monitoring.
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2 A Model of Firm Risk-taking and Financial Con-
tracting
2.1 Environment
Consider a firm run by a risk-neutral manager who owns a fraction of the firm’s shares
(henceforth the "manager" and the "firm" are used interchangeably). Risk-neutral out-
side investors own the remainder of the shares. The manager faces two projects, and
both projects require the same set-up cost, I. For simplicity, we assume that the set-up
cost is sunk. The two projects, project S and project R, are expected to be profitable
and diﬀer both in terms of riskiness and expected cash flow.
Project S and project R both generate three possible cash flow scenarios: 0 (fail), XL
(success) and XH (big success). We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 XH > XL > I > 0.
Table 1 shows the payoﬀs of the two projects. The manager is assumed to work eﬃciently,
and the success probability pv in Table 1 is exogenously determined. According to Table
1, the expected cash flows from project S and that from project R are given by
E(Yv) = (1− pv) XH/2 + pv XL, v = S and R. (1)
The variances of the cash flows from the two projects are given by
var(Yv) =
1
4
£
(1− pv)((1 + pv)X2H − 4pvXHXL + 4pvX2L)
¤
, v = S and R. (2)
We also make the following two assumptions
Assumption 2 pS > pR,
Assumption 3 XH − 2XL > 0.
Assumptions 2 and 3 give var(YR) > var(YS) and E(YR) > E(YS); i.e., project R is
riskier but generates a higher expected cash flow than project S.9 Projects R and S are
considered to represent any pair of business operations on the eﬃciency frontier, which is
the set of risk-return choices from the possible business operation opportunity set where,
for a given variance (expected return), no other business operation opportunity oﬀers a
higher expected return (lower variance). The eﬃciency frontier is located in a diﬀerent
9From (2) we can obtain var(YR) − var(YS) = 14(pS − pR)
h
(pS+pR)(XH-2XL)
2+4(XH-XL)XL
i
.
Furthermore, from (1) we can obtain E(YR)− E(YS) = (pS − pR)( 12XH −XL).
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position if the exogenous variables take on diﬀerent values. In other words, the firm’s
eﬃciency level is exogenously given by I, pv, XL, and XH .
For convenience, we assume that the firm has no liabilities, has assets, A0, and requires
A0 to undertake its projects. The firm’s assets, A0, include intangible assets, factories,
machines, and land. To simplify the analysis, we disregard other kinds of assets such
as cash on hand and marketable securities, so that the set-up cost, I, needs to be fully
financed by outside investors. We also assume
Assumption 4 A0 < I and 1 < A0 ≤ A0
where A0 is the minimum amount of A0 for a firm to be in operation. Assumption 4
indicates that the investors face a risk of losing their investment.
The manager chooses either project S or project R. The manager either borrows
from a single bank investor or issues shares to new outside investors in order to finance
the project (i.e., the bank loan and equity contracts are exclusive). We assume that the
investors are competitive.
2.2 Preliminary Model
We first present the preliminary model in which the loan contracts do not posses an early
demandable loan option. Studying this simple model will facilitate a clearer understand-
ing of the model later presented.
2.2.1 Model timing and contract types
Figure 1 describes the timing of the preliminary model. The time line is divided into
three stages: stage 0, stage 1 and stage 2.
(Stage 0) The contract is made and the firm receives funding.10 The manager then
chooses between project S and project R. We assume that the manager’s project choice
is unverifiable. Thus, a contract contingent on project choice (e.g., a contract that reads
"if the firm does not undertake project S, the firm faces a large penalty") cannot be
made.
(Stage 1) The investor chooses whether to monitor the firm at cost M (>0). The mon-
itoring cost, M , diﬀers among the investors. The manager can observe this monitoring
activity at no cost. The equity investor carries out active monitoring and the bank in-
vestor performs passive monitoring. That is, the equity investor can directly interfere
with the management of the firm and correct the course of action taken by the manager
(if the investor owns a large proportion of the shares), while the bank investor can only
10Before this stage, the manager asks multiple banks for a loan and at the same time considers issuing
shares.
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collect information about the firm’s activities (the information includes whether the firm
is pursuing project S or project R). We assume that although the monitoring reveals the
firm’s action (whether it is pursuing project S or project R) to the bank investor, the
action is still unverifiable. This implies that the bank investor cannot write a contract
contingent on the firm’s project choice. Therefore, the monitoring is useless to the bank
investor in the present setting; i.e., the bank investor has no incentive to monitor the
firm. However, a bank’s passive monitoring plays an important role in the model later
presented: the model in which the loan contracts can posses an early demandable loan
(at will) option. We also assume that in stage 1 the firm can change the project at no
cost after observing whether the bank investor has chosen to monitor or not.
(Stage 2) The verifiable cash flows are realized. Since the cash flows are verifiable, to
place the manager in an optimal incentive scheme, the bank investors can, in principle,
write a contract contingent on the project cash flows. We assume, however, that the bank
investors do not want to write the contingent contract because writing such a contract
is too costly. That is, the cost associated with verifying the firm’s outcome (realized
cash flow in the model) at the end of the period is assumed to be much higher than
the cost of writing a simple loan contract without costly verification. The bank loan
contracts hereafter do not require any verification of the firm’s outcome. Note also that
verifiability of cash flow is necessary because an equity contract is included in the model.
Equity contracting is not possible without verifiability of cash flow.
The equity contract, CE, and the loan contract, CD, are defined as
CE = CE(θ), CD = CD(r),
where θ is the manager’s shareholding ratio after new shares of the firm are issued and
r is the interest rate. The bank investor with CD has the right to seize the firm’s assets
upon default of the firm. The equity investor, on the other hand, does not have this right.
We first consider equity contracting. We assume that there are a number of homoge-
nous equity investors, and that the investor cannot finance the project alone. If the
manager decides to issue new shares (i.e., the manager decides to obtain funds from the
equity investors), he has the following expected net return by undertaking project v
πM(θ:v) = θ[pv (A0 +XL) + 1−pv2 (A0 +XH) +
1−pv
2
A0] − θ0A0
= θ(A0 +E(Yv))− θ0A0, v = S and R,
(3)
where θ0 is an initial shareholding ratio of the manager (the manager’s shareholding ratio
before new shares of the firm are issued). The term in [ ] shows the expected value of
the firm. The term θ0A0 represents the value that the manager obtains if project v is not
undertaken; i.e., θ0A0 is the manager’s reservation level of utility.
On the other hand, by purchasing the firm’s shares, the representative equity investor
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obtains the following expected return (if he does not monitor the firm, i.e., if he does not
pay M)
πEI(θ:v) = 1q [pv (1− (θ + eθ))(A0 +XL)
+ 1−pv
2
(1− (θ + eθ))(A0 +XH) + 1−pv2 (1− (θ + eθ))(A0)]
− I
q
, v = S and R,
(4)
where q is the number of homogeneous equity investors, and eθ is a shareholding ratio for
the initially existing equity investors after new shares of the firm are issued. The term eθ
can thus be written as a function of θ and θ0, i.e., eθ = eθ(θ, θ0). The term in [ ] represents
the expected value of the firm if project v is undertaken, and I
q
represents the amount
of investment made by the investor. Notice here that how many shares of the firm the
representative equity investor oﬀers to purchase by paying I
q
is the same thing as CE(θ)
being oﬀered to the manager by the homogeneous equity investors as a whole.
Equations (3) and (4) give
πM(θ:R)− πM(θ:S) =
(pS − pR) θ
2
(XH − 2XL), (5)
πEI(θ:R)− πEI(θ:S) =
(pS − pR)(1− θ)
2
(XH − 2XL). (6)
From Assumptions 2 and 3, πM(θ:R)− πM(θ:S) > 0 and πEI(θ:R)− πEI(θ:S) > 0; i.e.,
the equity investor and the manager both prefer project R to project S. Thus, an agency
problem does not arise in this case and the equity investor has no incentive to monitor
the firm.
Next, consider bank loan contracting. If the bank investor makes a loan to the firm,
the bank has the following expected return11
πBI(r:v) = pv rI +
1− pv
2
rI +
1− pv
2
(A0 − I −A w0 ), v = S and R, (7)
where
0 < w < 1, (8)
rI ≤ XL − I. (9)
The term (A0− I −A w0 ) in (7) shows what the investor obtains if the project fails (i.e.,
if the project cash flow is zero). The term A w0 represents the cost of liquidating firm
assets. Since assets A0 include intangible assets like firm-specific knowledge and know-
how, the assets becomes much less valuable if they are taken over by the bank investor
upon default due to failure of the project. The term A w0 captures this wedge between the
bank investor and the manager in the valuation of A0 . It can also include the transaction
11Note also that if rI > XL − I, then, πBI is, in some cases, not defined by (7). However, we can
safely ignore the case of rI > XL − I, because competitive investors are assumed.
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cost of liquidating A0, e.g., the cost of selling assets to third parties. This type of cost
can also be quite large.12
If the firm borrows from the bank investor, the manager has the following expected
net return by undertaking project v
πM(r:v) = θ0[pv(A0 +XL − (1 + r)I) + 1−pv2 (A0 +XH − (1 + r)I)]
− θ0A0, v = S and R.
(10)
As in the case of equity contracting, the term in [ ] and θ0A0 show the expected value of
the firm and the manager’s reservation level of utility, respectively.
Equations (7) and (10) give
πM(r:R)− πM(r:S) =
pS − pR
2
θ0 [XH − 2XL + (1 + r)I −A0] ,
πBI(r:R)− πBI(r:S) = −
pS − pR
2
[(1 + r)I −A0 +A w0 ] .
From Assumptions 2, 3, and 4, πM(r:R) − πM(r:S) > 0 and πBI(r:R) − πBI(r:S) < 0.
This means that, although the bank investor wants the manager to choose project S, the
manager has an incentive to choose project R. An agency problem thus arises in the
case of bank loan contracting. The important point here is the role of A w0 . Although
the existence of the agency problem does not hinge on the wedge A w0 (i.e., the agency
problem arises even if A w0 = 0), the bank’s preference for project S over project R is
stronger with A w0 . This point will be very important when we later analyze the model
with the early loan demand option.
2.2.2 Equilibrium contracts
We now analyze the preliminary model and demonstrate the equilibrium contracts. First,
we consider the loan contract, CD. Since the manager has an incentive to choose project
R in the loan contract and the bank investor figures this out, the bank investor knows that
πBI (r:R) is the only possible return. Thus, for the bank investor to have an incentive to
oﬀer the loan contract, the following constraint must hold
πBI(r:R) ≥ a, (11)
where a is the net return on investing I on risk-free assets and E(Yv) − I > a.13 From
(7) and (11), we obtain
r ≥ 1
1 + pR
[
2a
I
+ (1− pR)−
1− pR
I
(A0 −A w0 )] . (12)
12See Tirole (2006, pp. 164-171) for more concrete arguement of this kind of costs.
13Since a is the net return on risk-free assets, it is natural to assume E(Yv)− I > a.
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Under investor competition, the bank investor needs to oﬀer the CD which maximizes
the manager’s expected profits, in order for the contract to be accepted. Thus, we can
obtain the following lemma
Lemma 1 The contract which the bank investor oﬀers is given by
C∗D = CD(r), (13)
where
r =
1
1 + pR
[
2a
I
+ (1− pR)−
1− pR
I
(A0 −A w0 )], (14)
πBI(r:R) = a, (15)
πM(r:R) = θ0[E(YR)−
1− pR
2
A w0 − I − a]. (16)
Proof. Proof in the text.
C∗D is a feasible contract, assuming that πM(r:R) ≥ 0 holds. The term "feasible
contract" means that by signing such a contract, the manager and investor both obtain
the expected profits which are greater than or equal to their reservation levels. The
contract is not feasible if either the manager or the investor gets (knows that he gets) less
than the reservation level by signing it. The interest rate r is greater than zero based on
Assumption 4.
Next, consider the equity contract CE. For the equity investor to have an incentive
to invest I
q
, the following constraint must hold
πEI(θ:R) ≥
a
q
. (17)
From (4) and (17), we can then get
I + a
A0 +E(YR)
≤ 1− [θ + eθ(θ, θ0)]. (18)
The term 1− [θ+eθ(θ, θ0)] shows a shareholding ratio for the new equity investors. Since
the firm must issue at least one share to each of the homogeneous equity investors, the
following inequality must also hold
q
N0 + q
≤ 1− [θ + eθ(θ, θ0)], (19)
whereN0 is the number of shares initially issued (the number of shares outstanding before
the contract).
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Under investor competition, θ must take the highest possible value. Using (18) and
(19), the contract which the equity investor oﬀers is thus given by
C∗E = CE(θ),
where
1− [θ + eθ(θ, θ0)] = I + a
A0 +E(YR)
if
q
N0 + q
<
I + a
A0 +E(YR)
, (20)
1− [θ + eθ(θ, θ0)] = q
N0 + q
if
q
N0 + q
>
I + a
A0 +E(YR)
. (21)
Now denote θ
0
as the θ in (20). Using (3), we can then obtain
πM(θ
0
:R) = (A0 +E(YR)) θ
0 − θ0A0. (22)
Appendix A shows that θ
0
is given by
θ
0
= θ0
A0 +E(YR)− (I + a)
A0 +E(YR)
. (23)
Substituting (23) into (22) for θ
0
yields
πM(θ
0
:R) = θ0[E(YR)− (I + a)].
This result is as expected since the new equity investor receives just the reservation level.
Consequently, we can establish that
Lemma 2 If q
N0+q
< I+a
A0+E(YR)
, the contract which the equity investor oﬀers is given by
C∗E = CE(θ
0
),
where
θ
0
= θ0
A0 +E(YR)− (I + a)
A0 +E(YR)
,
πM(θ
0
:R) = θ0[E(YR)− (I + a)],
πEI(θ
0
:R) =
a
q
.
Proof. Proof in the text.
The contract CE(θ0) in Lemma 2 is a feasible contract since πM,EI(θ
0
:R) > 0 and
πEI(θ
0
:R) = a
q
.
Similar to the analysis above, we denote θ
00
as the θ in (21). We then can obtain the
following lemma.
12
Lemma 3 If q
N0+q
> I+a
A0+E(YR)
, the contract which the equity investor oﬀers is given by
C∗E = CE(θ
00
),
where
θ
00
=
F0
N0 + q
,
πM(θ
00
:R) = θ0
1
N0 + q
[N0E(YR)− qA0] ,
πEI(θ
00
:R) =
1
q
∙
q
N0 + q
(A0 +E(YR))− I
¸
.
Here, F0 is the number of the shares which the manager owns.
Proof. Proof in Appendix B.
In Lemma 3, πEI(θ
00
:R) > a
q
, since q
N0+q
> I+a
A0+E(YR)
. That is, the equity investor
obtains more than the reservation level even under competition. Assuming that q is not
large (i.e., q < N0
E(YR)
A0
, where E(YR)
A0
> 1), πM(θ
00
:R) > 0.14 Thus, CE(θ
00
) is a feasible
contract.
We are now in a position to examine the equilibrium contracts of the model.
Proposition 1 (i) If q
N0+q
< I+a
A0+E(YR)
, CE(θ
0
) is the equilibrium contract. (ii) If q
N0+q
>
I+a
A0+E(YR)
and 1−pR
2
A w0 + (a + I) − qN0+q (A0 + E(YR)) > 0, CE(θ
00
) is the equilibrium
contract. (iii) If q
N0+q
> I+a
A0+E(YR)
and 1−pR
2
A w0 +(a+ I)− qN0+q (A0+E(YR)) < 0, CD(r)
is the equilibrium contract.
Proof. (i) From Lemma 2, if q
N0+q
< I+a
A0+E(YR)
, CE(θ
0
) is the contract oﬀered by the equity
investor. As already shown, CD(r) and CE(θ
0
) are feasible contracts. From Lemmas 1
and 2, we can obtain
πM(θ
0
:R)− πM(r:R) = θ0
1− pR
2
A w0 .
This is greater than 0. Thus, the manager prefers CE(θ
0
) to CD(r).
(ii) and (iii) From Lemma 3, if q
N0+q
> I+a
A0+E(YR)
, CE(θ
00
) is the contract oﬀered by
the equity investor. As already shown, CD(r) and CE(θ
00
) are feasible contracts. From
Lemmas 1 and 3, we can obtain
πM(θ
00
:R)− πM(r:R) = θ0
∙
1− pR
2
A w0 + (a+ I)−
q
N0 + q
(A0 +E(YR))
¸
.
This can be negative or positive. Since θ0 > 0, πM(θ
00
:R) − πM(r:R) > 0 (< 0) if
1−pR
2
A w0 + (a+ I)− qN0+q (A0 + E(YR)) > 0 (< 0). Thus, the manager prefers CE(θ
00
) to
14Together with qN0+q >
I+a
A0+E(YR)
, we thus assume N0 E(YR)A0 > q >
N0 (I+a)
A0+E(YR)−I−a , where
E(YR)
A0
>
I+a
A0+E(YR)−I−a holds according to the assumptions.
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CD(r) if 1−pR2 A
w
0 + (a+ I)− qN0+q (A0 + E(YR)) > 0, and the manager prefers CD(r) to
CE(θ
00
) if 1−pR
2
A w0 + (a+ I)− qN0+q (A0 +E(YR)) < 0.
Proposition 1 is visualized as in Figure 2. In the figure, the straight line (L1) at the
top is given by
N0 =
q
a+ I
(A0 +E(YR))− q,
µ
⇔ q
N0 + q
=
I + a
A0 + E(YR)
¶
. (24)
Another line (L2) is given by
N0 =
q
1−PR
2
A w0 + a+ I
(A0 +E(YR))− q, (25)µ
⇔ 1− pR
2
A w0 + (a+ I)−
q
N0 + q
(A0 +E(YR)) = 0
¶
.
L1 and L2 never cross, and L2 is below L1 for A0 ≤ A0 < I.15 Figure 2 shows that
CD(r) is the equilibrium contract when N0 is small, such that qN0+q >
I+a
A0+E(YR)
and
1−pR
2
A w0 + (a + I) − qN0+q (A0 + E(YR)) < 0. This is because dilution of the manager’s
shareholdings by issuing new shares is large if N0 is low (i.e., θ0 − θ is large if N0 is
low), so that the manager prefers CD(r) to CE. However, when the manager realizes
the dilution is large, such that πM(θ
00
:R) − πM(r:R) < 0, he can, in principle, split the
shares first and then issue new shares. This procedure can provide the manager with
πM(θ
0
:R) because splitting the shares allows manager to drive down πEI(θ:R) to the
equity investor’s reservation level a
q
without aﬀecting the manager’s shareholding ratio.
This ends up being the case of q
N0+q
< I+a
A0+E(YR)
, because splitting the existing shares
before issuing the new shares implies an increase in N0: the equilibrium contract will
then be CE(θ
0
). We assume that there is a cost to share-splits, and this hinders the
manager from splitting the shares. Appendix C shows the eﬀect of the costs in detail. It
shows that if the costs are higher than θ0((1− pR)/2)Iw, the manager does not consider
splitting the shares.16
15At A0 = 0, the two lines intersects with each other.h
∂
³
q
¡
1−PR
2 A
w
0 + a+ I
¢−1
(A0 +E(YR))− q
´
/∂A0
i ³
q
a+I
´−1
−1 =©
-A w0 (1− pR)
£
2aA0 + A
1+w
0 (1− pR) + 2A0I + 2awA0 + 2wA0I + 2awE(YR) + 2wE(YR)I
¤ª
/
[2(a+ I) +A w0 (1− pR)]
2. The right hand side of this equation is less than
zero. Thus,
h
∂
³
q
¡
1−PR
2 A
w
0 + a+ I
¢−1
(A0 +E(YR)) - q
´
/ ∂A0
i
< qa+I . Note here thath
∂
³
q
¡
1−PR
2 A
w
0 + a+ I
¢−1
(A0 +E(YR)) - q
´
/ ∂A0
i
can be negative or positive. Line L2 in
Figure 2 represents the case of
h
∂
³
q
¡
1−PR
2 A
w
0 + a + I
¢−1
(A0 + E(YR)) - q
´
/ ∂A0
i
> 0.
16McGough (1993) and Angel (1997) argue that the costs of splitting shares (e.g., administrative
costs, transfer tax, and printing costs) can be substantial. Bebartzi, Michaely, and Weld (2007) report
that firms almost never split their shares in Japan.
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2.3 The Model
We have shown that the loan contract and the equity contract can each be an equilibrium
contract, but that the contract type does not matter in the manager’s project choice. The
manager always plays it risky (chooses project R). In this subsection, we show that the
manager, in some cases, plays it safe (chooses project S) by selecting the loan contract.
Remember that the bank investor faces an agency problem. To overcome the problem,
he devises a way to discipline (threaten) the manager. Otherwise, the manager will never
play it safe (i.e., never choose project S). To discipline the manager, the bank investor
must provide a credible threat to the manager by including some sort of option in the
loan contract.
Since the firm’s action–to make "safe" or "risky" choices–is not verifiable, and the
bank never wants to write a contract contingent on the project outcome (because it is
too costly), the option must be a non-contingent one. Although the option could take
any form, it is reasonable to suppose that the bank investor thinks of including a non-
contingent early loan demand option in the contract; i.e., an option for the investor to
liquidate the project early at will. This loan contract can be interpreted as a short-
term loan with a possible rollover, which is common in banking. Most commercial bank
loans are, in fact, of the short-term type, and banks often refuse to roll over maturing
short-term loans. The contract with the early loan demand option preserves the most
important feature of a rollover loan; i.e., a bank’s total control over continuation of the
project implemented by its borrowing firm.
At first glance, it seems hard for the loan contract with the early demand option
to be an equilibrium contract because: (i) the agency problem exists between the firm
and the bank investor (but not between the firm and the equity investor), (ii) the firm
chooses any of the three competitive contracts, and (iii) the bank with the demandable
loan contract can liquidate the project early at will. We will show, however, that under
certain conditions, the firm selects the loan contract with the early demand option and
plays it safe in equilibrium.
2.3.1 Model timing and contract types
Model timing is slightly changed from the preliminary model, as shown in Figure 3. In
contrast to the preliminary model, early loan demand is now possible during stage 1 if the
option is written in the contract and passive monitoring is implemented. If the project is
liquidated in stage 1, the firm receives no cash flow. Here we assume that the liquidation
requires monitoring because the bank investor must know about the firm (e.g., it must
know where the assets are placed) in order to intervene and seize the assets. In other
words, passive monitoring makes it possible for the bank investor to liquidate the project
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early.17
The equity contract is the same as the one shown in the preliminary model. The loan
contract is now defined by
CD = CD(r, L, Z) ,
where L denotes the early liquidation option (L = 1 if the option is included and L = 0
otherwise), and Z is the payment received by the bank from the firm in liquidation of the
project. Z may include collateral. If L = 0, Z = 0, and Z > 0 if L = 1. Note here that
the firm never wants its project to be liquidated because, if the project is liquidated early,
it receives no cash flow and must pay Z > 0. For analytical convenience, we divide CD
into two types: a type A loan contract and a type B loan contract. The type A contract,
CDA, has L = 0, and the type B contract, CDB , has L = 1. Thus, they can be written as
CDA = CDA(r) and CDB = CDB(r, Z).
CDA is identical to the loan contact studied in the preliminary model. Thus, an
immediate corollary arises from Lemma 1:
Corollary 1 If the bank investor does not include the early loan demand option, the
contract which the bank investor oﬀers is given by
C ∗DA = CDA(r),
where
r =
1
1 + pR
[
2a
I
+ (1− pR)−
1− pR
I
(A0 −A w0 )],
πBI(r:R) = a,
πM(r:R) = θ0[E(YR)−
1− pR
2
A w0 − I − a],
and C∗DA is a feasible contract.
Consider next CDB . The bank investor with CDB has three possible returns: πBI(r:R),
πBI(r:R)−M , and πBI(r:S)−M . Return πBI(r:S) is not possible because: (i) the man-
ager knows that the bank needs to monitor the firm in order to liquidate the project early,
(ii) the manager can switch the project after observing whether the bank is monitoring
or not, and (iii) the manager, with a given interest rate, prefers project R to project
S.18 With a given interest rate, πBI(r:R), πBI(r:R)−M , and πBI(r:S)−M are ordered
17As we will show later, this gives the bank investor an incentive to monitor the firm. In contrast, in
the preliminary model, the bank does not have an incentive to monitor and thus no monitoring occurs.
18In fact, (ii) with (i) is the same as assuming that the bank can (contractually) commit to monitor
the firm because the contractual commitment also makes it impossible for the bank to obtain πBI(r:S).
Condition (ii) is an important assumption of the model. Without it, costly monitoring conducted by the
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according to either
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
πBI(r:R)−M < πBI(r:R) < πBI(r:S)−M
or
πBI(r:R)−M < πBI(r:S)−M < πBI(r:R).
(26)
In the following, we examine the feasibility of CDB , using (26) in relation to the bank
investor’s reservation level of utility, a.
Before examining the feasibility of CDB , we rule out the cases which clearly lead to
non-equilibrium CDB , in order to simplify our analysis of the model. With πBI(r:R) ≥ a,
Corollary 1 gives
πM(r:S) < πM(r:R) ≤ πM(r:R) . (27)
Expression (27) tells that the manager prefers C∗DA to CDB(r, Z) with {(r, Z) | πBI(r:R) ≥
a}.19 Thus, under investor competition where any bank can oﬀer C∗DA, CDB(r, Z) with
{(r, Z) | πBI(r:R) ≥ a} cannot be the equilibrium contract of the model, even if it
is a feasible contract. In the following analysis, we can thus safely ignore the case of
πBI(r:R) ≥ a.
To analyze the feasibility of CDB , we first consider CDB(r, Z) with {(r,Z) | πBI(r:R)
< a and πBI(r:S) - M <a}. With this contract, (26) can be rewritten as
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
πBI(r:R) < πBI(r:S)−M < a.
or
πBI(r:S)−M < πBI(r:R) < a.
(28)
Expression (28) indicates that the bank has no incentive to oﬀer CDB(r, Z) with {(r,Z)
| πBI(r:R) <a and πBI(r:S) - M <a} unless a ≤ Z −M . From (28), the CDB(r, Z)
with a ≤ Z−M implies that the investor liquidates the project regardless of whether the
manager plays it safe or risky. Therefore, since the liquidation provides the manager with
return less than his reservation level, then CDB with {(r,Z) | πBI(r:R) < a and πBI(r:S)
- M < a} cannot be a feasible contract.
Next, consider CDB(r, Z) with {(r,Z) | πBI(r:R) < a and πBI(r:S) - M ≥ a}. For
bank cannot be credible under any circumstances because, from an ex post perspective, the bank investor
has no incentive to monitor the firm. This leads to the result that CDB cannot be the equilibrium contract
of the model. Khalil (1997) and Khalil and Parigi (1998) study this kind of commitment problem and
analyze a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In order to keep the model simple, we have decided not to follow
this approach. Many studies, e.g., Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992) and Repullo and Suarez (1998), make
the assumption that the bank can commit to monitor.
19To be precise, this arguement is not exactly correct. C∗DA and the CDB which gives the manager the
same level of return as C∗DA are indiﬀerent for the manager in terms of his expected monetary return. We
assume herein that the option somehow results in a negative impact on the manager’s choice of contract.
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this contract, (26) can be rewritten as
πBI(r:R)−M < πBI(r:R) < a ≤ πBI(r:S)−M . (29)
Considering (29), we can establish the following lemma
Lemma 4 CDB(r, Z) (excluding CDB(r, Z) with {(r, Z) | πBI(r:R) ≥ a}) is a feasible
contract only if it is with
{(r, Z) | πBI(r:R) < a ≤ πBI(r:S)−M, πBI(r:R) < Z < πBI(r:S)} , (30)
and, if the manager ever accepts feasible CDB(r, Z), he or she undertakes project S.
Proof. To examine the feasibility of CDB(r, Z) with {(r, Z) | πBI(r:R) < a ≤ πBI(r:S) -
M }, we consider (i) Z ≤ πBI(r:R), (ii) Z ≥ πBI(r:S) and (iii) πBI(r:R) < Z < πBI(r:S)
in turn (note that these three cases cover every possibility, since πBI(r:R) < πBI(r:S)).
First, consider the case of Z ≤ πBI(r:R). If Z ≤ πBI(r:R), Z −M ≤ πBI(r:R)−M.
From (29), we then obtain
Z −M ≤ πBI(r:R)−M < πBI(r:R) < a ≤ πBI(r:S)−M .
This expression indicates that the bank investor has no incentive to liquidate the project
because doing so results in the lowest return (Z−M). With this knowledge, the manager
plays it risky if he accepts the contract. The investor thus gets πBI(r:R) − M < a.
Therefore, the CDB with Z ≤ πBI(r:R) is not a feasible contract (knowing that he
receives πBI(r:R)−M < a, the bank investor never oﬀers this contract).
Second, consider the case of Z ≥ πBI(r:S). If Z ≥ πBI(r:S), Z −M ≥ πBI(r:S) −
M . From (29), we then obtain
πBI(r:R)−M < πBI(r:R) < a ≤ πBI(r:S)−M ≤ Z −M .
This expression implies that the bank investor liquidates the project regardless of what
the manager does. Since the liquidation of the project gives the manager a return less
than his reservation level, then the CDB(r, Z) with Z ≥ πBI(r:S) is not a feasible contract.
Finally, consider the case of πBI(r:R) < Z < πBI(r:S). If πBI(r:R) < Z < πBI(r:S),
πBI(r:R)−M < Z −M < πBI(r:S)−M . (31)
With this contract, the bank investor’s best choice of action is to monitor the firm, and
the liquidation threat becomes credible. The reasoning is as follows. If the bank does not
monitor, it gets a return less than the reservation level (πBI(r:R) < a from expression
29). If the bank monitors, the bank is better to liquidate the project in the case that the
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manager plays it risky, according to (31): πBI(r:R) −M < Z −M . Since the manager
never wants to be liquidated, observing that the bank is monitoring and thus knowing that
the bank is ready to liquidate the project, he does not play it risky.20 According to (31),
the bank then gets πBI(r:S)−M ≥ a, which is the highest possible return in this case.
This leads the bank and the manager to believe that the bank’s best choice of action is to
monitor the firm, and thus the threat of liquidation becomes credible.21 As a result, the
manager plays it safe, and the bank obtains πBI(r:S)−M ≥ a if the contract is signed.
This contract also provides another form of credibility. According to (31): Z −M <
πBI(r:S)−M , the bank has no incentive to liquidate as long as the manager plays it safe
(bank monitoring reveals whether the manager is playing it safe or risky). In other words,
the level of Z given by (30) makes the manager believe that the bank will not execute
the liquidation option if the manager plays it safe. This makes the contract acceptable
to the manager. CDB with (30) is thus a feasible contract (a ≤ πBI(r:S) −M in (30)
holds if M is not too large).
According to the previous analyses, CDB(r, Z)with {(r,Z) | πBI(r:R)< a and πBI(r:S)
-M < a} is not a feasible contract. CDB(r, Z) (excludingCDB(r, Z) with {(r,Z) | πBI(r:R)
≥ a}) is thus a feasible contract only if it is with {(r,Z) | πBI(r:R) < a ≤ πBI(r:S) - M ,
πBI(r:R) < Z < πBI(r:S)}, and the manager plays it safe if he accepts feasible CDB .
The important point in Lemma 4 and its proof is that a feasible type B loan contract
is "credible" to the manager in two ways. First, it is credible in the sense that the
manager knows that the bank investor will liquidate the project if the manager plays
it risky. Second, the contract is credible in the sense that the manager knows that the
bank investor will not liquidate the project (i.e., the bank will let the business go) as
long as the manager plays it safe. The first form of credibility works as a disciplinary
device for the manager, and the second form of credibility makes the contract acceptable
to the manager, even though the contract gives the bank total control over the firm’s
operation. By setting r and Z given by Lemma 4, CDB(r, Z) gains these two forms of
credibility at once. For example, with a given Z, CDB(r, Z) having a value of r that is
too high or too low neither disciplines the manager nor represents a feasible contract.
Interestingly, with a given r, Z works as not only as a threatening device, but also as a
relieving device for the manager by making the manager believe that the bank will not
execute the liquidation option as long as he plays it safe.
Other important points are that, as mentioned in the proof of Lemma 4, a ≤
πBI(r:S)−M in (30) cannot hold if M is too large, and that the bank (weakly) prefers
feasible CDB(r, Z) to CDA(r) (see Corollary 1 and Lemma 4).
20Note that the manager’s observation of bank monitoring is important. The manager observes bank
monitoring, and this makes the manager believe that the bank is ready to liquidate the project if the
manager does not behave himself (remember that monitoring is required for liquidation).
21This is not possible without the assumption that the manager can switch the project after observing
bank monitoring. See note 18.
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2.3.2 Diﬀerent M
We have not yet considered bank competition in oﬀering CDB(r, Z), although monitoring
costM is assumed to diﬀer among the investors. Consider the eﬀects of such competition
in the following.
There are many possible candidates that cause M to vary across banks. The most
important factor is probably the bank’s relationship with the firm. We assume that the
bank more closely tied to the firm has a lower level of M because the closer relationship
leads to an informational advantage. For example, in Japan, it is common for banks to
temporarily (typically for several years) transfer their executives to client firms as senior
executives (sometimes even as board members), and also for client firms to hire the retired
executives of their banks. Banks that send their executives to client firms are likely to
pay lower monitoring costs than banks with no close connection with their client firms.
We define bank 1 as the bank with the closest relationship to the firm and bank 2 as
the second closest one. We denote η as closeness, where a bank with a lower level of η is
more closely tied to the firm. We then have
0 < η1 < η2 , (32)
where the subscript indicates bank 1 or bank 2. To simplify the analysis, we also assume
M = η . (33)
By defining rB as the interest rate that satisfies πBI(rB:S) −M = a and using (7) and
(33), we can obtain
rB(η) =
1
(1 + pS)I
[(1− pS)(I −A0 +A w0 ) + 2(a+ η)] . (34)
Since feasible CDB requires πBI(r:S)−M ≥ a according to Lemma 4, rB shows the lower
bound on r of feasible CDB for a given Z: as already shown by using (28), with r <rB
the bank liquidates the project early regardless of what the manager does. Equations
(32) and (34) then provide the following inequality
rB(η1) < rB(η2) . (35)
Now suppose bank 2 oﬀers feasible CDB(r2, Z2), where r2 = rB(η2), that is, in oﬀering
the contract, bank 2 sets the interest rate at the lowest possible level. By accepting this
contract, the firm gets πM(r2:S) (remember from Lemma 4 that the manager chooses
project S by accepting feasible CDB). However, bank 1 can oﬀer an even better deal to
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the manager. For example, bank 1 can oﬀer feasible CDB(r1, Z1), such that:
rB(η1) ≤ r1 < r2 = rB(η2) and Z1 = Z2 .
The manager prefers the CDB(r1, Z1) to the CDB(r2, Z2), since πM(r2:S) < πM(r1:S).22
Note here that the levels of Z1 and Z2 are irrelevant to the firm’s return as long as Z1 and
Z2 satisfy πBI(r:R) < Z < πBI(r:S) in (30) of Lemma 4 (i.e., as long as the contracts
are feasible). This is because if the manager accepts feasible CDB , he undertakes project
S and knows that the bank will not liquidate the project as long as he behaves himself
(so that Z is not in his return function). We can thus establish that
Lemma 5 Bank 1 can oﬀer feasible CDB which dominates any feasible CDB of bank 2.
Proof. Proof in the text.
An immediate corollary from Lemmas 4 and 5 is
Corollary 2 If CDB is ever signed, the contract is always the one oﬀered by bank 1.
Bank 1 can oﬀer feasible CDB(r1, Z1) if its monitoring cost (M1 = η1) is not large.
Bank 1 can obtain more than its reservation level if its feasible CDB is accepted by the
manager. In addition, bank 1 prefers feasible CDB(r1, Z1) to C ∗DA because C
∗
DA
gives bank
1 just the reservation level.
2.3.3 Equilibrium contracts
We can now examine the model’s equilibrium contracts. Since we are interested in know-
ing under what circumstances the manager undertakes project S, we focus on finding the
conditions for which feasible CDB(r1, Z1) becomes the equilibrium contract of the model.
To find the equilibrium conditions, we start by comparing feasible CDB(r1, Z1) with
the feasible CDA, C∗DA = CDA(r). Let us first define rB, such that
πM(r:R) = πM(rB:S).
As Corollary 1 shows, r is the interest rate of C∗DA. Solving the equation for rB yields
rB =
1
(1 + pS)I
[(1− pR)A w0 + (1− pS)(I −A0) + 2a+ (pS − pR)(2XL −XH)] . (36)
Only if feasible CDB(r1, Z1) has an interest rate less than rB, the manager prefers it to
CDA(r). Remember that rB(η1) is the lower bound on r1 of feasible CDB(r1, Z1). Thus,
22Although not directly comparable, this result and the implication of (35) seem to be consistent with
the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995). They find that firms with closer
bank relations are charged a lower interest rate.
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for feasible CDB(r1, Z1) to be an equilibrium contract, it must have r1 , such that
rB(η1) < r1 < rB . (37)
Bank 1 sets r1 in the range given by (37). The level of r1 selected from this range depends
on η2 and the upper bound on r1 of feasible CDB(r1, Z1).23
Considering (37) and using (34) and (36), we can get the following necessary condition
for equilibrium CDB(r1, Z1).
rB − rB(η1) =
1
(1 + pS)I
[(pS − pR)(A w0 − (XH − 2XL)− 2η1] > 0. (38)
The term rB − rB(η1) cannot be positive without the wedge A w0 . In other words, the
equilibrium condition cannot be met without A w0 . This is because the bank’s preference
for project S over project R cannot be strong enough without A w0 , and thus bank 1 has
no incentive to oﬀer a type B contract with an r1 low enough to attract the manager.
To obtain the equilibrium conditions, we also need to compare feasible CDB(r1, Z1)
with feasible CE. Let us define r0E and r00E, such that
πM(θ
0
:R) = πM(r0E:S), (39)
πM(θ
00
:R) = πM(r00E:S) (40)
where θ
0
and θ
00
are given by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively. Solving equations
(39) and (40) gives
r0E =
1
(1 + pS)I
"
2(pS − pR)XL − (pS − pR)XH
+(1− pS)(I −A0) + 2a
#
, (41)
r00E =
1
(1 + pS)I
"
E(YS)− N0N0+qE(YR) +
³
1+pS
2
− N0
N0+q
´
A0
−
¡
1+pS
2
¢
I
#
. (42)
Remember from the analysis of the preliminary model that: (i) if q
N0+q
< I+a
A0+E(YR)
,
the equity investor oﬀers CE (θ
0
), and (ii) if q
N0+q
> I+a
A0+E(YR)
, the equity investor oﬀers
CE(θ
00
). (CE(θ
0
) and CE(θ
00
) are feasible contracts.) Thus, since rB(η1) is the lower
bound on r1 of feasible CDB(r1, Z1), in order for feasible CDB(r1, Z1) to be an equilibrium
contract, it must have r1 , such that
rB(η1) < r1 < r0E if
q
N0+q
< I+a
A0+E(YR)
,
rB(η1) < r1 < r00E if
q
N0+q
> I+a
A0+E(YR)
.
(43)
23We can derive the upper bound on r1 of feasible CDB (r1, Z1) from Lemma 4.
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From (34), (41) and (42), we can obtain
r0E − rB(η1) =
1
(1 + pS)I
"
(pS − pR)(2XL −XH)
−(1− pS)A w0 − 2η1
#
, (44)
r00E − rB(η1) =
1
(1 + pS)I
"
2
³
E(YS)− N0N0+qE(YR)
´
+ 2q
N0+q
A0
−(1− pS)A w0 − 2(I + a+ η1)
#
. (45)
The values for r0E−rB(η1) in (44) cannot be positive, since pS−pR > 0 fromAssumption 2,
2XL−XH < 0 from Assumption 3 and η1 > 0. Therefore, according to (43), CDB(r1, Z1)
cannot be an equilibrium contract if q
N0+q
< I+a
A0+E(YR)
. Thus, the following necessary
conditions for equilibrium CDB(r1, Z1) are obtained
r00E − rB(η1) =
1
(1 + pS)I
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
2
³
E(YS)− N0N0+qE(YR)
´
+ 2q
N0+q
A0 − (1− pS)A w0
−2(I + a+ η1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ > 0, (46)
q
N0 + q
>
I + a
A0 +E(YR)
. (47)
In sum, we can establish that
Proposition 2 The conditions for equilibrium CDB(r1, Z1) are (all of the following in-
equalities must be met)
[(pS − pR)(A w0 − (XH − 2XL)− 2η1] > 0, (48)"
2
³
E(YS)− N0N0+qE(YR)
´
+ 2q
N0+q
A0
−(1− pS)A w0 − 2(I + a+ η1)
#
> 0, (49)
q
N0 + q
− I + a
A0 +E(YR)
> 0. (50)
If CDB(r1, Z1) is the equilibrium contract, the manager undertakes project S.
Proof. Proof in the text.
The left hand sides of (48), (49) and (50) can be positive or negative. From the
condition in Proposition 2, we can obtain the following set of equations.
∂CD0
∂η1
= ∂CD
00
∂η1
= −2 (< 0),
∂CD00
∂N0
= − q
(N0+q)2
[A0 +E(YR)] (< 0),
∂CD000
∂N0
= − q
(N0+q)2
(< 0),
∂CD0
∂A0
= wA w−10 (> 0),
∂CD00
∂A0
= 2q
N0+q
− w(1− pS)A w−10 ,
∂CD000
∂A0
= a+I
(A0+E(YR))2
(> 0),
(51)
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where CD0, CD00 and CD000 are the left hand sides of (48), (49), and (50), respectively.
The signs of the values in (51) are shown in parentheses. Apart from ∂CD
00
∂A0
, all of the
signs are singly determined, as shown in (51).
2.3.4 From the model to the empirical test
To test the model empirically, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 5 For any given η1, A0, and N0, the probability that firm i has CD0 > 0,
CD00 > 0, and CD000 > 0 at time t is nonzero.
Assumption 6 η1, A0, and N0 are not correlated with the other variables.
Assumption 6 implies that η1, A0, and N0 are not correlated with the productivity
(eﬃciency) of the firm because pv, XL, XH , and I together reflect the productivity. Since
this may not be true in reality, using a panel of data for Japanese firms, our empirical
tests attempt to control for diﬀerences in firm productivity by including a firm-specific
eﬀect, a time eﬀect and a heterogeneous linear time trend.
Since (51) shows that ∂CD
0
∂η1
, ∂CD
00
∂η1
, ∂CD
00
∂N0
, and ∂CD
000
∂N0
are all negative, assumptions 5
and 6 lead to the following corollary
Corollary 3 (i) Holding N0 and A0 fixed, the lower the level of η1, the more likely firm
i is to undertake project S at time t, and (ii) holding η1 and A0 fixed, the lower the level
of N0, the more likely firm i is to undertake project S at time t.
Although (51) shows ∂CD
0
∂A0
> 0 and ∂CD
000
∂A0
> 0, the eﬀect of A0 on the firm’s project
choice is not clear: ∂CD
00
∂A0
can be negative or positive. We assume that ∂CD
00
∂A0
> 0 holds
because our empirical test employs the data for firms with relatively large A0
N0
(relatively
high share prices) and, if A0
N0
is large, ∂CD
00
∂A0
is positive according to (51). The model then
implies that holding N0 and η1 fixed, the higher the level of A0, the more likely firm i
is to undertake project S at time t. We would like to empirically test this together with
Corollary 3.
Above all, we make the following testable hypotheses for the model:
Hypothesis 1 Holding all other factors constant, the closer relationship firm i has with
banks, the safer but less profitable project firm i undertakes at time t,
Hypothesis 2 Holding all other factors constant, the lower the number of firm i’s out-
standing shares, the safer but less profitable project firm i undertakes at time t,
Hypothesis 3 Holding all other factors constant, the lager the scale of firm i’s produc-
tion, the safer but less profitable project firm i undertakes at time t.
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When making these hypotheses, we interpret η1 as a firm’s relationship with its banks
in general rather than with a single bank (we will show how this is measured later). This
is because: (i) although in the model η1 is the firm’s relationship with bank 1 (the most
closely related bank), in reality it is often diﬃcult to correctly identify which bank has
the closest tie with the firm, and (ii) more importantly, firms, generally, borrow from
several banks. Concerning N0 and A0, N0 is simply the number of outstanding shares of
a firm, and A0 represents the scale of a firm’s production since A0 is the assets required
to undertake the project (including both tangible and intangible assets).
3 Empirical Testing of the Model
In this section, we empirically test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. The testing consists of
two parts. The first regression test considers firm i’s risk taking behavior (henceforth
FRTi). The hypotheses suggest that FRTi is influenced by firm i’s relationship with its
banks, the number of firm i’s outstanding shares, and the scale of its production. The
second regression test considers firm i’s operating profitability (ROAi: return on assets).
The hypotheses suggest that the three variables (firm i’s relationship with banks, the
number of firm i’s outstanding shares, and the scale of its production) influence ROAi
through their eﬀect on FRTi. As we will later show, the testing is an interactive two-step
procedure in which the first and second regression tests complement each other.
3.1 Specification of FRT regressions
We will now derive the regression specification for the first test. According to the hy-
potheses, FRTi at time t can be given by
FRTi,t = c
FRT + ζFRTi + λ
FRT
t + α1 BRi,t + α2 NSi,t + α3 SCi,t, (52)
where cFRT is a constant eﬀect across time and firms, ζFRTi is a firm-specific eﬀect, λ
FRT
t
is a time eﬀect, BRi,t is firm i’s relationship with its banks at time t, NSi,t is the number
of outstanding shares of firm i at time t, and SCi,t is the scale of production for firm i at
time t. An increase in FRTi,t means that firm i takes more risks. An increase in BRi,t
indicates that firm i has a closer relationship with its banks (measured by a decrease in
η1,i in the model). The hypotheses tell that α1 < 0, α2 > 0, and α3 < 0. We want to
estimate α1, α2, and α3, but FRTi,t is unobservable (we cannot observe how much risk
a firm has actually taken). We demonstrate a strategy to overcome this problem.
Assume that the following relationship exists
Ei,t
£
φi,t+1
¤
= cEF + ζEFi +Ei,t[λ
EF
t+1] + α4 FRTi,t, α4 > 0, (53)
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where Ei,t is an expectation operator, φi,t+1 is the uncertainty of firm i’s profitability
at time t + 1 (i.e., the degree of deviation of ROAi,t+1 from Ei,t [ROAi,t+1]), cEF is a
constant eﬀect across time and firms, ζEFi is a firm-specific eﬀect, and λ
EF
t+1 is a time
eﬀect. Ei,t
£
φi,t+1
¤
is the value of φi,t+1 that firm i expects at time t and Ei,t[λ
EF
t+1] is
the value of λEFt+1 expected at time t. We believe that the assumed relationship of (53)
is reasonable. With α4 > 0, (53) shows that Ei,t
£
φi,t+1
¤
is positively related to FRTi,t:
taking more risks at time t, firm i expects that the uncertainty of its profitability will
increase at time t+ 1.
Next, by substituting (52) into (53) for FRTi,t, we obtain
φi,t+1 = c
F + ζFi + λ
F
t + α4α1 BRi,t + α4α2 NSi,t + α4α3 SCi,t + ε
F
i,t+1, (54)
where
cF = α4cFRT + cEF ,
ζFi = α4ζ
FRT
i + ζ
EF
i ,
λFt = α4λ
FRT
t + λ
EF
t+1,
εFi,t+1 = (φi,t+1 −Ei,t
£
φi,t+1
¤
) + (λEFt+1 −Ei,t[λEFt+1]). (55)
Equation (54) is our basic regression specification to test the hypotheses (we will later
show how to measure φi,t+1).24 As (55) shows, the term εFi,t+1 in (54) is the sum of firm
i’s expectation error for φi,t+1 and that for λ
EF
t+1. Thus, treating εFi,t+1 as an error term,
we can obtain unbiased coeﬃcient estimates from the regression.
Estimating the coeﬃcients of (54), we can test the relationship shown in (52). To test
whether α1 < 0, α2 > 0, and α3 < 0 hold, we need only to check the estimates of α4α1,
α4α2, and α4α3 since we know α4 > 0. If the estimates for α4α1 and α4α3 are negative
and significant, and the estimate for α4α2 is positive and significant, partial evidence for
the model’ validity is obtained.
3.2 Specification of the firm profitability regressions
We next show the regression specification for the second test. In the first regression
test, we examine whether BRi,t, NSi,t, and SCi,t have an eﬀect on FRTi,t, as the model
predicts. However, this is not enough to prove the validity of the model. The model shows
that BRi, NSi, and SCi influence ROAi through their eﬀect on FRTi, i.e., through the
risk-taking channel.
24Some of the coeﬃcients in (54) vary across firms and time because the values in (51) are not constant,
except ∂CD
0
∂η1
and ∂CD
00
∂η1
. Since it is a formidable task to allow the coeﬃcients to diﬀer as shown by (51),
we restrict the coeﬃcients to be constant.
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According to the hypotheses, we can obtain the following expression
Ei,t [ROAi,t+1] = c
ROAE + ζROAEi +Ei,t[λ
ROAE
t+1 ] + β1 FRTi,t, (56)
where ROAi,t+1 is firm i’s return on assets at time t+1, cROAE is a constant eﬀect across
time and firms, ζROAEi is a firm-specific eﬀect, and λ
ROAE
t+1 is a time eﬀect.25 Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
is the value of ROAi,t+1 that firm i expects at time t, andEi,t[λROAEt+1 ] is the value of λ
ROAE
t+1
expected at time t.
Using (52) and (56), we can get
ROAi,t+1 = c
ROA + ζROAi + λ
ROA
t+1 + β1 [FRT i,t + εROAi,t+1, (57)
where
[FRT i,t =[α4α1 BRi,t +[α4α2 NSi,t +[α4α3 SCi,t
cROA = cROAE + δcRTA,
ζROAi = ζ
ROAE
i + δζ
RTA
i ,
λROAt = λ
ROAE
t+1 + δλ
RTA
t ,
εROAi,t+1 = (ROAi,t+1 −Ei,t [ROAi,t+1]) + (λROAEt+1 −Ei,t[λROAEt+1 ]). (58)
Equation (57) is our basic regression specification. The values of [α4α1, [α4α2, and [α4α3
are the coeﬃcient estimates from the first regression, and thus [FRT i,t reflects the part
of FRTi,t explained (predicted) by BRi,t, NSi,t, and SCi,t.26 If the hypotheses are valid,
we should find that β1 > 0. The term εROAi,t+1 in (57) is the sum of the two expectation
errors, as shown by (58). As before, treating εROAi,t+1 as an error term, we can thus obtain
unbiased coeﬃcient estimates.
The test is thus an interactive two-step procedure. First, we do the FRT regression
and estimates the coeﬃcients. Then, using the predicted value [FRT , we estimate β1.27
We need support from both tests in order to verify the validity of the model.
25As shown in the data appendix, ROAt+1 is measured by (operating profits at t + 1)/(total assets
at time t).
26Although [FRT i,t is α4 times the part of FRT predicted by the three variables, it does not matter
for the test of β1 in terms of sign and significance. This is because α4 only scales up the predicted part
of FRT .
27We could also directly include BR, NS and SC in the second regression test. However, this approach
would not correctly identify the eﬀect of FRT on ROA, since these variables might influence ROA in
other ways; e.g., SC might aﬀect ROA through an economy of scale (the eﬃciency channel) rather than
the risk-taking channel.
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3.3 The measurement of φi,t+1
An important variable in our empirical test is φi,t+1, and measurement of this variable
using a new approach is explained in detail in this subsection.28
The variable φi,t+1 represents the uncertainty of firm i’s outcome. It represents the
degree of deviation of ROAi,t+1 from Ei,t [ROAi,t+1]. We can easily obtain ROAi,t+1, but
not Ei,t [ROAi,t+1]. While firms usually make their expected ROA available to the public,
it is very diﬃcult to obtain their ‘true’ expected ROA. For example, firms frequently
disguise the fact that their business is not going well. We show below how to obtain the
‘true’ expected ROA.
First, by assuming that firms are rational, we can get the following equations
ROAi,t+1 −Ei,t[ROAi,t+1] = ei,t+1, (59)
Ei,t[ei,t+1] = 0. (60)
Note here that the ‘true’ expected ROA, Ei,t[ROAi,t+1], cannot be observed.
Denote tROAPi,t+1 as the expected value of ROAi,t+1, which is publicly announced by
firm i at time t. We assume that tROAPi,t+1 takes the following form
tROA
P
i,t+1 = c
P + ζPi + λ
P
t + μEi,t[ROAi,t+1], (61)
where cP is a constant eﬀect across time and firms, ζPi is a firm-specific eﬀect, and λ
P
t
is a time eﬀect (i.e., a macroeconomic eﬀect). Equation (61) states that firm i publicly
announces its expected ROA by incorporating the true expected value of ROA to some
extent μ as well as the firm-specific and macroeconomic eﬀects.
Substituting (61) into (59) for Ei,t[ROAi,t+1] yields
ROAi,t+1 = c
∗ + ζ∗i + λ
∗
t+1 +
1
μ
(tROA
P
i,t+1) + ei,t+1 (62)
where
c∗ =
1
μ
cP ,
ζ∗i =
1
μ
ζPi ,
λ∗t+1 =
1
μ
λPt+1.
We can thus obtain Ei,t[ROAi,t+1] (= ROAi,t+1 − ei,t+1) by running the panel regression
based on (62) and getting the predicted values of ei,t+1 (we treat ei,t+1 as an error term
in the regression).
28The measure is originally due to Okada and Sato (2005).
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Using the obtained value of Ei,t[ROAi,t+1], we calculate φi,t+1 as
φi,t+1 = ln
µ¯¯¯¯
ROAi,t+1 −Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
¯¯¯¯
+ 1
¶
. (63)
The reason for using logarithmic value is to reduce the eﬀect of outliers. When the
mean of ROAi,t+1 − Ei,t[ROAi,t+1] is zero and ROAi,t+1 − Ei,t[ROAi,t+1] is normally
distributed,
¯¯¯
ROAi,t+1−Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
¯¯¯
is skewed greatly to the right. In this case, the eﬀect
of outliers can be reduced by applying the following methods: (i) taking the squares of
ROAi,t+1−Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
if many of the outliers are in the left tail of the distribution, or (ii)
taking the logs of ROAi,t+1−Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
if many of the outliers are in the right tail of the
distribution. Since the distribution is skewed to the right, the outliers are more likely to
be in the right tail of the distribution. Thus, logs are used. The reason for adding add 1
to
¯¯¯
ROAi,t+1−Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
¯¯¯
before taking the logs in (63) is that ln
³¯¯¯
ROAi,t+1−Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
¯¯¯´
approaches −∞ when
¯¯¯
ROAi,t+1−Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
¯¯¯
get close to zero.29
We believe that using the above measurement as φi and then estimating (54) by treat-
ing φi−Ei [φi] as an error term (an expectation error) can serve as a much more reliable
test of the model, compared with estimating (53) by using the ex post variance of ROAi
as a proxy for the ex ante uncertainty, Ei [φi].30 This is because it is diﬃcult (or impossi-
ble) for the ex post variance of ROAi to correctly incorporate changes in Ei,t[ROAi,t+1]
when Ei,t[ROAi,t+1] changes frequently and dramatically over time. Also, when using the
ex post variance as a proxy for the ex ante uncertainty, Ei [φi], measurement error on
Ei [φi] is absorbed in the disturbance of the regression, which may be highly correlated
with the dependent variables, e.g., the firm-specific and time (macroeconomic) eﬀects.
Furthermore, since φi is obtainable at an annual frequency, we can acquire a much larger
number of usable time-series observations for a regression than can be obtained using the
ex post variance. These points allow us to reliably carry out panel regressions to control
for a firm-specific eﬀect, a time eﬀect, and a heterogeneous linear time trend (i.e., to
control for unobserved firm eﬃciency), and thus mitigate the problem of omitted variable
bias.
3.4 Data and variables
The empirical work presented in this section uses two databases. We have obtained data
on company’ profit forecasts from Toyo Keizai Shinposha’s Kaisha Yosou database, and
other data from the Development Bank of Japan’s corporate finance database.
Our sample includes non-financial Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Market, the Osaka Stock Market, and the Nagoya Stock Market (both the 1st and 2nd
29However, this does not significantly change our results.
30See equations (54) and (55) for our treatment of φi −Ei [φi].
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sections). The sample period spans from 1981 to 2002 (the panel is unbalanced).
We next explain some of the variables used for the tests (the data appendix shows the
details of all variables used). As for BRi,t, it is diﬃcult to find a variable that measures
the relationship of firm i with banks in a panel format (preferably at an annual frequency,
since φi,t+1 is annual). We use the shareholding ratio of the top three bank shareholders.31
We assume that the firm issuing a larger number of shares to banks has a closer bank
relationship because banks frequently hold their client firms’ shares in order to access
important information about the firms. Note that in Japan, the Banking Law and the
Fair Trade and Anti-Trust Laws prohibit bank ownership of more than five percent of
a firm’s outstanding shares, so that a bank is more likely to hold a firm’s shares for an
informational advantage and/or other purposes, rather than for investment purposes. To
proxy the scale of production of a firm, SCi,t, we use the log of total sales.32 In the
model, the firm’s production scale largely depends on its intangible assets like brand,
firm-specific knowledge and know-how, and human capital. Thus, total sales rather than
total assets are more appropriate.
3.5 Results
We first show the results from simple cross-sectional regressions. We average all of the
variables over the sample period and run OLS regressions with industry dummy variables
(47 industry categories). The results are shown in Table 2, and they seem to support
the model’s predictions. All of the coeﬃcient estimates have the signs predicted by the
model. Although [FRT i,t does not enter significantly in the profitability regression, all
variables in the FRT regression enter significantly.
The cross-sectional regressions may severely suﬀer from an omitted variable bias since
we do not include a variable which measures firm eﬃciency (the eﬃciency can be corre-
lated with BR, NS, and SC). To mitigate the problem, we run the panel regressions
with firm-specific and time eﬀects as shown by (54) and (57).
Several points should be noted. First, we construct BR, NS, and SC by taking
an average of one to three (or four) year lagged values. This is because it most likely
takes several years before a firm’s risk-taking behavior has an eﬀect on its outcome.33
Second, to account for the firm-specific eﬀect, we use a first diﬀerencing transformation
of (54) and (57). When making the transformation, we use a four (or five) year interval
31Related to the measure of bank-firm relationship, to measure bank control, Morck, Nakamura, and
Shivdasani (2000) use a percentage of main bank ownership of outstanding shares, and Hoshi, Kashyap,
and Scharfstein (2000) use a main bank loan share. We do not use main bank-related data to measure
bank-firm relationships because we consider a firm’s relationship with multiple banks rather than a
powerful single bank.
32Many other studies use the log of sales as a proxy for the production scale, e.g., Morck, Nakamura,
and Shivdasani (2000) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998).
33In addition, concerning SC, averaging "total sales" over several years reduces the demand eﬀect on
"total sales."
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for the first diﬀerencing. This is because noise will account for a large proportion of the
variations in the first diﬀerenced variables if the interval is not long enough. Third, apart
from the time and firm-specific eﬀects, we also allow a heterogeneous linear time trend.
Together with the time and firm-specific eﬀects, the heterogeneous time trend can give us
more power to control unobserved variables, such as firm productivity. To estimate the
model with the heterogeneous time trend, we use a within-group estimation after taking
the first diﬀerence.
Tables 3 and 4 give the results using the first-diﬀerencing interval of four and five
years, respectively.34 FRT regressions (1) and (3) are conducted with the homogeneous
trend, and FRT regressions (2) and (4) are conducted with the heterogeneous trend.
The [FRT of profitability regressions (1)-a and (1)-b is calculated by using the coeﬃcient
estimates of FRT regression (1), and the [FRT of the other profitability regressions is
calculated in a similar way.
The results, generally, support the model’s predictions. As for the FRT regressions,
(i) all of the coeﬃcient estimates of BR show a correct sign and are significant, (ii)
most of the coeﬃcient estimates of SC show a correct sign and are significant, and (iii)
although none of the coeﬃcient estimates of NS are significant, most of them (except
one) show the sign predicted by the model. As for the profitability regressions, excluding
case (4)-b in Table 3, the coeﬃcient estimates with the heterogeneous time trend have a
correct sign, and most of them are significant. Although (4)-a and (4)-b in Table 3 show
that the estimates have a wrong sign and are significant, the [FRT of these regressions is
calculated by using the wrong-signed coeﬃcient estimate of SC shown by (4) in Table 3.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the eﬀects of financial contracts on a firm’s choice between safer and
riskier projects. Assuming that a firm requires financing from a competitive investor, we
show that three types of contracts can each be an equilibrium contract, depending on var-
ious conditions. The three contracts are: (i) a bank loan contract with an (unconditional)
early loan demand option, (ii) a bank loan contract without the demand option, and (iii)
an equity contract. The first contract is considered to be a rollover loan. It preserves the
most important feature of a rollover loan; i.e., a bank’s total control over continuation of
the borrowing firm’s project. We show that firms undertake a “safer” (“riskier”) project,
when using rollover loans (non-rollover loans or new share issues). The model emphasizes
the role of a rollover loan as a disciplinary device to suppress a firm’s risk-taking. One
key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with closer bank relationships are
more likely to use rollover loans and undertake a “safer” project, even with a competitive
34The standard errors are heteroscedasticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors (Ar-
relano,1987).
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capital market. The model provides testable hypotheses, and the empirical tests do not
reject the hypotheses. The paper also proposes a new measure of the uncertainty for firm
performance that results in more reliable empirical tests.
We focus on the disciplinary role of bank loans by stressing the eﬀect of the uncon-
ditional early loan demand option. When considering firms with relatively healthy and
large assets, our approach has perhaps more practical relevance than studies emphasizing
bank control rights that are contingent on firm default. This is because such firms usually
have a relatively low probability of bankruptcy, and a shift in control rights upon default
would not have a very large impact on disciplining the firms.
5 Appendix A: the derivation of θ
0
The term θ
0
+ eθ(θ0, θ0) is shown by
θ
0
+ eθ(θ0, θ0) = F0
N0 + F
0 +
N0 − F0
N0 + F
0 =
N0
N0 + F
0 , (A1)
where F0 is the number of the shares owned by the manager, and F
0
is the number of newly
issued shares if q
N0+q
≤ I+a
A0+E(YR)
. Since 1− [θ0 +eθ(θ0, θ0)] = I+aA0+E(YR) if qN0+q ≤ I+aA0+E(YR) ,
from (A1), we can obtain
N0 + F
0
= N0
A0 +E(YR)
A0 +E(YR)− (I + a)
. (A2)
Using θ
0
= F0
N0+ F
0 , θ0 = F0N0 and (A2), we can then obtain
θ
0
= θ0
A0 +E(YR)− (I + a)
A0 +E(YR)
.
Appendix B: proof of lemma 3
From (21), if q
N0+q
> I+a
A0+E(YR)
q
N0+q
1− [θ00 + eθ(θ00, θ0)] = q
N0 + q
. (A3)
In (A3), q is equal to the number of newly issued shares. Thus, θ
00
is given by
θ
00
=
F0
N0 + q
, (A4)
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where F0 is the number of the shares which the manager owns. From (3) and (A4), we
obtain
πM(θ
00
:R) =
F0
N0 + q
(A0 +E(YR))− θ0A0.
Since X0
N0+q
= θ0 N0N0+q , this equation can be rewritten as
πM(θ
00
:R) = θ0
N0
N0 + q
(A0 +E(YR))− θ0A0 = θ0
1
N0 + q
[N0E(YR)− qA0] .
Using (A3) and (4), we obtain
πEI(θ
00
:R) =
1
q
∙
q
N0 + q
(A0 +E(YR))− I
¸
.
Appendix C: the cost of splitting shares
If the manager thinks that the dilution is large; i.e., πM(θ
00
:R)− πM(r:R) < 0, he or she
splits the shares first and then issues new shares. As explained in the text, this procedure
will give the manager πM(θ
0
:R) if there is no cost to a share split. We assume that
there are fixed share-splitting costs of G. The manager then does not consider splitting
the shares if πM(θ
0
:R) − G < πM(r:R) holds. Using Lemmas 1 and 2, the inequality
πM(θ
0
:R)−G < πM(r:R) can be rewritten as
G > θ0
1− pR
2
A w0 . (A5)
Since A0 < I, the manager never considers splitting the shares if G > θ0 1−pR2 I
w.
Data appendix
• ROAi,t: (operating profits at time t) / (total assets at time t− 1).
• tROAPi,t+1 (the expected value of ROA which firm i makes available to the public
at time t ): (predicted operating profits at time t+1 which is publicly announced
at time t) / (total assets at time t).
• φt+1: ln
³¯¯¯
ROAt+1−Et[ROAt+1]
Et[ROAt+1]
¯¯¯
+ 1
´
.
• BRi,t (a shareholding ratio of top three bank shareholders of firm i at time t): (the
number of firm i’s shares held by the top three bank shareholders at time t) / (the
total number of firm i’s shares at time t).
• NSi,t (the number of firm i’s outstanding shares at time t): the log of the number
of firm i’s outstanding shares at time t.
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• SCi,t (firm i’s production scale at time t): the log of firm i’s total sales at time t.
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